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Abstract
This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of the competition law between the merger
and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction of these two branches of the competition
policy given the budget constraint of the competition agency and taking into account the
ensuing incentives for ﬁrms’ behavior in terms of choice between cartels and mergers. We
are thus able to conclude on the optimal competition policy mix. We show for instance that
to the extent that a tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers taking place, the public
agency will optimally invest only in control ﬁghting for a tight budget, and then in both
instruments as soon as the budget is no longer tight. However, if the merger’s coordinated
eﬀect is taken into account, then when resources are scarce the agency may optimally have
to spend ﬁrst on controlling mergers before incurring the cost of ﬁghting cartels.
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11. Introduction
Competition authorities address the challenge of anticompetitive horizontal agreements both
by controlling mergers and ﬁghting cartels. Under the realistic assumption of a limited budget
of the public agency, one may ask how much should be spent on ﬁghting cartels as compared
with controlling mergers. Taking into account the incentives thus provided to ﬁrms, we develop
in this paper a very simple framework to determine the optimal competition policy mix between
merger control and cartel ﬁghting.
Firms have been known to adapt their behaviour to past decisions of the competition agency.
The most famous example is probably that of the Sherman Act, which, in the words of Mueller
(1996), "ironically, by prohibiting cartels, encouraged ﬁrms to combine [...] and thus helped
precipitate the ﬁrst great merger wave at the turn of the century"1. Its impact on the ﬁrst
merger wave was empirically conﬁrmed by Bittlingmayer (1985). More recently, and based on
the analysis of duration for a sample of international cartels prosecuted in the 1990s, Evenett et
al (2001) found that joint ventures and mergers are adopted by ﬁrms in cartel-prone industries
where cartel formation is restricted. The following real-life example supports this statement:
in 2005 the three main players on the French local markets of urban transport were ﬁned for
part-taking in an anti-competitive agreement to share the public transport market of urban bus
services during calls for tender2. As a result, two of them, Transdev and Veolia, changed plans
and ﬁve years later notiﬁed a horizontal merger, which was granted conditional approval by the
French Competition Authority at the end of 20103.
In our model we ﬁrst discuss the case of this apparent substitutability between mergers
and cartels. Then we also consider their complementarity, i.e. the case where ﬁrms merge
before engaging in collusion. This possibility is explicitly taken into account by the competition
agencies, which are bound to assess a merger’s coordinated eﬀect during its overall competitive
appraisal4. Nonetheless, merger control being prone to errors, ﬁrms may sometimes still take the
opportunity to collude after having merged. For instance, on November 9, 2010, the European
Commission ﬁned 11 air cargo carriers €799 million in a price ﬁxing cartel that spanned over
six years, from December 1999 to 14 February 20065 on the European cargo services market.
1This American example was later "conﬁrmed" in the UK by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956,
which similarly triggered a merger wave by outlawing cartels - see Symeonidis (2002).
2See decision 05-D-38 of July 5, 2005, available on the site of the Autorité de la Concurrence.
3See decision 10-DDC-198 of December 30, 2010, also available on the site of the Autorité de la Concurrence.
4See for instance the European Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines - OJ C 31/5, from 5.2.2004,
paragraphs 39 to 57.
5See the European Commission’s press release IP/10/1487.
2Interestingly enough, most of the European airlines involved (such as British Airways, AirFrance-
KLM, SAS and Lufthansa-Swiss Air) had previously engaged in several successive mergers on the
European airfreight market6, which had all gained approval from the European Commission7.
We start by discussing the ﬁrms’ choice to coordinate, and consider ﬁrst that they can either
form a cartel or notify and undertake a horizontal merger. The relative proﬁtability of the two
options will depend on the probability for a cartel to be convicted, as well as on the private
gains from mergers. Cartel ﬁghting is imperfect in our model, as not all cartels get punished,
and the probability to convict a cartel will depend on the amount of resources allocated for this
purpose. This amount will therefore capture the severity of this action. The enforcement of
merger control is also imperfect, since the ex ante assessment of horizontal mergers inevitably
gives rise to both types of errors, i.e. clearing welfare-reducing anti-competitive mergers and
banning cost-eﬃcient pro-competitive ones. This is mainly due to the asymmetric information
between the competition agency and the merging partners on the true level of potential cost
savings. Accordingly, in our model the competition agency (CA henceforth) will only be able
to identify and prohibit the anti-competitive mergers after paying a ﬁxed cost. The latter will
thus capture in our model the severity of merger control. At any rate, given the limited budget
of the CA, devoting more resources to ﬁghting cartels will prevent it from applying a stricter
merger control, and vice-versa.
The trade-oﬀ we put forward in this framework is the following. Whenever more money is
spent on ﬁghting cartels, not only will more cartels be detected and punished and thus welfare
losses avoided (a detection eﬀect), but also ﬁrms will be prompted to abandon cartel formation
and undertake instead horizontal mergers (a so-called selection eﬀect). The detection eﬀect
is always positive, but the sign of the selection eﬀect depends on the welfare impact of the
mergers that are triggered when more cartels get detected. We derive the ﬁrst result from
the net outcome of these two eﬀects in terms of relative returns of the two instruments of the
competition policy. More precisely, with a tight budget, the returns from merger control are so
low that the CA will optimally invest only in ﬁghting cartels. It will however eventually spend
money on both branches of competition policy if more resources are available, because in this
6See the cases M.157/1992, M.259/1992, M.278/1993, M.562/1995, M.616/1995, M.967/1997, M.1128/1998,
M.1328/1999, M.1696/1999, M.2672/2002 and the joint-venture M/2830/2002.
7Ironically, when clearing the GF-X joint venture for an air freight trading platform between several European
airlines (Lufthansa, Air France, British Airways and Global Freight Exchange Limited - see case M.2830/2002),
the European Commission declared that the joint venture was set up in such a way that it would not lead to any
co-ordination of the competitive conduct of the parent companies on the market for air freight transport - see the
European Commissison’s press release IP/02/1560 form October 28, 2002.
3case the two instruments complement each other. This result may no longer hold when one takes
into account the merger’s coordinated eﬀect, i.e. its impact on post-merger market collusion.
This materializes as a higher likelihood for a cartel to be formed and sustained after a horizontal
merger, and therefore makes the ﬁrms’ strategies of merger and cartel complements. To account
for this, we allow the ﬁrms to choose between forming a cartel from the beginning, or merging
ﬁrst and later on forming a more stable cartel. In this case, and for a high enough coordinated
eﬀect of the merger, the best way for the CA to ﬁght against cartels is to prevent the mergers in
the ﬁrst place. In other words, despite scarce resources, the CA cannot avoid paying the price
of a strict merger control.
To put it short, we ﬁnd that for a tight budget the CA’s optimal policy depends on the
relationship between cartels and mergers from the ﬁrms’ point of view: if they are substitutable,
then the CA optimally invests only in cartel-ﬁghting, but if they are complementary, the CA
must pay for merger control before investing in cartel-ﬁghting.
This is to our knowledge the ﬁrst research paper to examine the optimal competition law
enforcement mix between merger control and cartel ﬁghting. In a related but diﬀerent context,
Aubert and Pouyet (2004) dealt with the relationship between cartel-ﬁghting and sectorial regu-
lation8. As far as antitrust and merger control are concerned, the only theoretical contribution,
albeit from a positive perspective, is that of Mehra (2008), which deals with the ﬁrms’ choice
between merger and cartel depending on the severity of the anti-cartel action (the ﬁne in case
the cartel is detected).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst present the benchmark case of our
analysis, then extend it to take into account the merger’s coordinated eﬀect. Each time we
discuss ﬁrst the optimal strategies of the ﬁrms and the CA, then we establish the optimal policy
mix between merger control and cartel ﬁghting. All formal proofs are grouped at the end of the
paper in a technical appendix.
2. Model
Consider the following reduced-form setting, in which the CA chooses the amount of resources
to be spent on ﬁghting cartels and controlling mergers, whereas a group of two ﬁrms may
coordinate in order to improve proﬁtability either by colluding or by engaging in a horizontal
8See also Bensaid et al. (1995), which investigate the optimality of having a unique antitrust authority to deal
with both cartel and mergers, or whether it is on the contrary best to separate the two on account of information
and incentives issues.
4merger. The group of two ﬁrms is considered as a single player and we assume risk-neutrality
throughout. The cartel is formed and not detected with probability c(∆), where ∆ stands for
the amount of resources spent by the CA on ﬁghting cartels, with c′(∆) < 0, c′′(∆) > 0 and
Lim
∆→+∞
c(∆) = 0. It provides a joint collusive payoﬀ of πC. It may however either fail to be
formed or be detected and punished with probability 1− c(∆)9. If so, then the ensuing payoﬀ
for the ﬁrms will be the status-quo competition10 joint proﬁt π < πC.
The horizontal merger on the other hand is not only a legal means to achieve coordination,
but also a source of cost savings or eﬃciency gains, denoted by e. The joint proﬁt earned is
then equal to πM(e). For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of cost savings,
either high or low, e > e, leading to πM(e) > πM(e). Both types occur with equal probability,
and the merger is always more proﬁtable than price ﬁxing because of eﬃciency gains, all else
equal: πM(e) > πC. We assume that the eﬃciency gains parameter e is a priori not observed
by the CA. The CA may however invest M > 0 in merger control in order to investigate the
merger project and then to observe the true level of eﬃciency gains. Otherwise the merger is
not investigated and if so the merger is permitted11. Finally, the merging ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed
cost K in order to merge. This assumption captures the fact that coordination through merger
is likely to be costlier than through collusion, or at any rate that merging requires a sunk





a cumulative distribution function F(x). The cost K is high enough to avoid the trivial case
where the ﬁrms always merge: πM(e) − πC < K.
In terms of competition policy, the CA maximizes the expected consumers’ surplus from both
ﬁghting cartels and controlling mergers13. The total amount of resources available is exogenous
and equal to R ≥ M. Let WC denote consumers’ welfare following a successful cartel, and W the
status-quo competition welfare without any coordinated behavior whatsoever, with WC < W.
A strict cartel policy denotes that the whole resources R are spent against cartels, while a soft
cartel policy implies that only ∆ < R will be used for this purpose. Concerning the merger policy,
the post-merger consumers’ welfare is equal to WM(e), where WM(e) > WM(e), meaning that
9We do not explicitly use cartel ﬁnes, but their role is captured by the probability 1 − c(∆) for the cartel to
function poorly.
10Our results do not depend on the type of competition (price or quantities) prevailing on the market.
11We follow here Sørgard (2009).
12The point worth stressing is that price-ﬁxing does not require a structural change in the organization of the
partners, and also that there are legal constraints (notiﬁcation) to be obeyed and legal costs (lawyers’ fees) to be
incurred for a merger to be initiated.
13In practice, mergers get cleared or banned depending on the expected competitive impact, which is basically
assessed in terms of expected post-merger price variation.
5the more eﬃciency gains the higher the consumers’ surplus. We also consider that the ineﬃcient
merger is welfare-reducing but still preferable to the cartel (Wc < WM(e) < W), whereas the
eﬃcient merger is welfare-improving (WM(e) > W). We focus on the possible trade-oﬀ between
cartel formation and choice of merger for the ineﬃcient merger projects only, so we assume
that the eﬃcient merger is always more proﬁtable than the cartel: K < πM(e) − πC. In our
framework the CA implements a soft merger control whenever it does not investigate mergers
and thus clears e-mergers as well as e-ones. When the CA invests M to investigate merger
projects, we call it a strict merger control. Thus the policy choice under the budget constraint
consists in either implementing the toughest cartel ﬁghting by spending R on it, or carrying out
both merger control and cartel ﬁghting by investing M in the former14.
The timing of the game will be the following:
At the ﬁrst stage the CA chooses the amount of resources ∆ allocated to ﬁghting cartels
and decides whether to invest M in merger control.
At the second stage, the ﬁrms make their coordination choice between horizontal merger
and collusive behavior. If the merger is chosen, they notify it to the CA.
At the ﬁnal stage, notiﬁed mergers are cleared or banned. If there is no merger, then
the cartel is convicted with probability 1−c(∆) and the market is forced back to its status-quo
competition situation. Otherwise, the industry ends up with the collusive market outcome.
The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and in what
follows we solve the game backwards.
3. Optimal competition policy mix
At the ﬁnal stage, the CA clears the merger given the available information, i.e. depending
on the amount of resources available and its own previous choice of how much to spend on
merger control. At the second stage, when deciding how best to achieve proﬁtable coordination,
the ﬁrms anticipate the outcome of the CA’s decision. This means that the choice between
horizontal merger and cartel is determined by the probability for a cartel to be detected on the
one hand, and the merger control decision on the other.
14Although dealing with the CA’s optimal activity level in terms of cartel prosecutions, Harrington (2011)
mentions the possibility of endogenizing the amount of public resources allocated to cartel ﬁghting by considering
a ﬁxed budget that the CA must divide among its various activities, such as prosecuting cartels, controlling
mergers and investigating market monopolization.
6Lemma 1. (i) If the merger is expected to be cleared at the ﬁnal stage, there exists a cost
threshold   K(∆) increasing with ∆, such that the ineﬃcient merger is notiﬁed iﬀ K ≤   K(∆).
(ii) If the CA invests in merger control, there exists a threshold of resources   R such that the
CA blocks the ineﬃcient merger iﬀ R >   R.
Lemma 1 states ﬁrst of all that the choice of ﬁrms stems from a self-selection eﬀect according
to which the merger is preferred to cartel for a low enough merging cost15. Furthermore, this
threshold depends on the amount spent on ﬁghting cartels. The intuition is straightforward:
the merger is possibly costlier than the cartel as a means to increase joint proﬁts, so it takes a
low enough merger cost for the ﬁrms to prefer it to price-ﬁxing. In addition, the more resources
dedicated to ﬁghting cartels, and thus the higher the cartel detection probability, the higher the
incentives for ﬁrms to prefer the merger instead.
Secondly, if the CA invested in information acquisition for merger control, it will block the
merger provided that enough resources are available: R >   R. This is easily explained: a merger
will be blocked if the resulting expected welfare is lower than if the ﬁrms are not allowed to
merge, which in our model means they may form a cartel. So for a merger to be welfare-reducing,
the cartel ﬁghting needs to be suﬃciently eﬀective, i.e. enough money needs to be spent on de-
tecting and punishing cartels.
Going back to the ﬁrst stage, the CA determines whether to pay or not for merger control,
and thereby how much to invest in cartel ﬁghting. The following proposition gives the result of
this trade-oﬀ:
Proposition 1. There exists R∗ such that the optimal competition policy consists of soft merger
control and strict cartel ﬁghting for R < R∗, but strict merger control and soft cartel ﬁghting
for R ≥ R∗.
Let us explain this result. For very few resources the choice is straightforward. Indeed, below
  R, the CA clears the ineﬃcient merger even if the merger type is observed thanks to the initial
investment M. As a result, there is no beneﬁt in investing in merger control. The best policy
mix consists therefore of no/soft merger control and the investment of the whole resources in
the ﬁght against cartels. With more resources (R >   R), the beneﬁt to invest in merger control
becomes positive, since the CA will now prevent e-mergers and thus avoid welfare losses. Thus
the CA will face a trade-oﬀ between enforcing the toughest cartel ﬁghting at the cost of not
15Price-ﬁxing is not the dominant strategy of type e ﬁrms, since ￿ K(∆) > 0 always thanks to π
M(e) > π
C.
7controlling mergers, and being more lenient towards cartels (i.e. spend less than R on ﬁghting
them) so as to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. The outcome of this trade-oﬀ depends on the
relative marginal beneﬁt of investing in cartel ﬁghting with or without merger control.
If the CA does not invest in merger control, then the expected welfare for the ineﬃcient
merger type writes EW(R) = F(   K(R))WM + (1 − F(   K(R))[c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W], and
therefore an increase in the resources dedicated to ﬁghting cartels has the following eﬀect on the
expected welfare:
(1 − F(   K(R))  
∂c(R)
∂R
  (Wc − W)
      
detection eﬀect, >0
+f(   K)  




WM(e) − [c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W]
 
      
selection eﬀect, <0
Spending one more euro on the ﬁght against cartels improves their detection, which is always
welfare-improving. This is the positive detection eﬀect highlighted above. Yet, this tougher
cartel scrutiny pushes ﬁrms to merge instead. This is the selection eﬀect, negative for R >   R
according to Lemma 1, which therefore reduces the beneﬁt from investing in cartel ﬁghting. The
selection eﬀect is basically the cost not to control mergers, and increases with the amount of
resources spent on ﬁghting cartels.
If, on the contrary, the CA does control mergers, then the expected welfare for the ineﬃcient
merger type writes EWmc(R) = c(R − M)   Wc + (1 − c(R − M))   W, and the impact of one
more euro spent to ﬁght cartels equals
∂c(R − M)
∂R
  (Wc − W)
      
detection eﬀect
.
Clearly, the merger control increases the marginal beneﬁt of ﬁghting against cartels, due to
both a higher detection eﬀect and the absence of the negative selection eﬀect. In other words,
both instruments tend to become complements and could induce the CA to split the resources
between merger control and cartel ﬁghting. However this is not the case for R∗ > R >   R.
Indeed, over this range of resources, the beneﬁt of paying M for a strict merger control is,
although positive, still lower than that of allocating the whole R to cartel ﬁghting. Only for
R > R∗ does the payment of M yield a higher expected welfare, making the optimal competition
policy a combination of (strict) merger control with cartel ﬁghting.
4. Post-merger cartel and the impact of merger coordinated eﬀect
We give up in this section the assumption that ﬁrms choose mergers over cartels or vice-versa.
In other words, we replace this strict substitutability between the strategies of merger and cartel
by their possible complementarity, i.e. the case of cartel formation following the merger. For
this purpose we modify our framework in the following way:
8Whenever the ﬁrms merge they also form a cartel detected with a probability 1−δc(∆) where
δ ≥ 1. Parameter δ captures the higher stability of cartels for more concentrated markets, and
therefore measures the size of the merger’s coordinated eﬀect. In case of cartel after merger, the
joint proﬁt is equal to πMC(e) > πC and the consumers’ welfare is equal to WMC(e). Similarly,
let also WMC(e) > WC, thanks to the merger’s eﬃciency gains16. If the ﬁrms do not merge,
the probability for the cartel to be detected is still equal to 1 −c(∆). However, we assume now
that if no resources are invested in cartel ﬁghting, then the post-merger cartel goes undetected:





of our game is unchanged.
As before, we start our analysis by deriving the CA’s merger control decision as well as the
ﬁrms’ merger decision in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. (i) If the merger is expected to be cleared at the ﬁnal stage, there exists a cost
threshold   K(∆) such that the merger is notiﬁed iﬀ K ≤   K(∆).   K(∆) is increasing with ∆ for
low values of δ, but decreasing with it for high values of δ.
(ii) If the CA invests in merger control, there exists a threshold of resources   R(δ) such that
the CA blocks the merger for R >   R(δ). Moreover,   R(δ) = M for δ high enough.
There are two substantial diﬀerences as compared with Lemma 1 where the merging ﬁrms
do not form a cartel. First of all, increasing the severity of the anti-cartel ﬁghting may have a
diﬀerent eﬀect on the merger decision according to the size of the merger’s coordinated eﬀect. For
a low coordinated eﬀect, an improvement in the detection of cartels induces the ﬁrms to merge,
as before. Nevertheless, the opposite obtains for a high enough coordinated eﬀect, because the
post-merger collusion may simply be the very reason why ﬁrms decide to merge in the ﬁrst
place. As a result, the tougher cartel ﬁghting will reduce the beneﬁt to merge and thus will
deter more mergers. Secondly, a high enough coordinated eﬀect may make the merger control
beneﬁcial even if no resources are available for cartel ﬁghting, precisely because ﬁrms merge in
order to form a cartel. Thus the merger control enables the CA to prevent cartels and as such
has a positive return even if no resources are invested in cartel ﬁghting itself.





17Equivalently, let c(∆) =
￿
A−∆
A , for ∆ ≤ A
0, for ∆ > A
, where A > 0 and constant.
9The next result shows how the optimal policy mix may change due to the possibility of
post-merger cartel:
Proposition 2. (i) For low δ, there exists a threshold R∗∗(δ) such that the optimal competition
policy consists of soft merger control and strict cartel ﬁghting for R ≤ R∗∗(δ), but strict merger
control and soft cartel ﬁghting for R > R∗∗(δ);
(ii) A high enough δ leads to R∗∗(δ) = M, i.e. the optimal policy mix implies strict merger
control and soft cartel ﬁghting for any R.
As compared with Proposition 1, we show here that the introduction of the merger’s co-
ordinated eﬀect may lead the CA to always invest in merger control even for a very low level
of resources. This result arises because the high coordinated eﬀect makes both policy instru-
ments substitutable, while at the same time lowers the returns from cartel ﬁghting. These two
outcomes induce the CA to never invest all the available resources in cartel ﬁghting only. To
explain this result, let us start by comparing the marginal returns from cartel ﬁghting with and
without merger control in the case of ineﬃcient merger projects:
- if the CA does not invest in merger control, then an increase in the resources allocated
against cartels has the following marginal eﬀect on the expected welfare:
∂c(∆)





K −   K(∆)
 
K
  (WC − W)





  δ(WMC − WM)




      
detection eﬀect, always >0
+









W   (1 − c(∆)) + WC   c(∆)
  
      
selection eﬀect
;
- if in turn the CA does pay M in order to control mergers, then the impact of a similar






      
detection eﬀect, >0
.
According to Lemma 2, the high coordinated eﬀect leads to a positive selection eﬀect from a
tougher cartel ﬁghting, because a larger share of ineﬃcient mergers is now deterred (
∂ ￿ K(∆)
∂∆ < 0).
In addition, the high coordinated eﬀect also leads to a larger selection eﬀect without merger
control. It follows a higher marginal eﬀect of cartel ﬁghting when there is no merger control. In
the same way, we can show that the return from merger control decreases with the amount of
resources invested in cartel ﬁghting. Again, this is due to the positive selection eﬀect: when the
CA invests a large amount of resources in cartel ﬁghting, a large share of ineﬃcient mergers is
deterred despite the absence of merger control. In other words, both instruments tend to become
10substitutable, which may induce the CA to always invest the whole resources in one instrument
only. Nevertheless, the coordinated eﬀect also lowers the expected welfare with cartel ﬁghting
only (∂EW
∂δ < 0). This eventually leads the CA to always invest in merger control. This result
holds even if no money is available for cartel ﬁghting. To see this consider the limit case where
R = M. The expected welfare without merger control, equal to
(K− ￿ K(M))
K   ((1 − δc(M))WM +
δc(M)WMC)+
￿ K(M)
K ((1−c(M))W +c(M)WC), must be balanced against the expected welfare
with merger control: ((1 − c(0))W + c(0)WC). The merger’s coordinated eﬀect has a double
impact on this welfare comparison. On the one hand, a high enough δ leads to a very high   K(M).
Accordingly, spending only on cartels will deter to a large extent ineﬃcient mergers. Moreover,
cartel deterrence is high since all resources are dedicated to cartel ﬁghting. But on the other
hand, if the CA does pay M on merger control, then the CA will always block the e-mergers,
which are very ineﬃcient precisely because of the high coordinated eﬀect δ. Consequently, a high
enough merger coordinated eﬀect will optimally lead the CA to spend almost all available on
controlling mergers, and hence implement a strict merger control. In short, with scarce resources
and a high coordinated eﬀect, the best way to ﬁght against cartels is also to block mergers.
5. Conclusion
This paper examines the optimal enforcement competition policy mix in terms of merger
control and anti-cartel policies, knowing that the observation of real-life market behavior in-
dicates that ﬁrms typically react to the current enforcement focus of the competition agencies
(against either mergers or cartels). When studying the interaction between the enforcement of
merger control and cartel ﬁghting, we accounted for the resulting incentives for ﬁrms, as well as
for the budget constraint of the competition agency.
When mergers and cartels are substitutable from the point of view of ﬁrms (i.e. they choose
one over the other), we obtain that cartel ﬁghting and merger control are complementary. Given
the comparison between their respective returns, this means that the CA will optimally invest in
both branches of the competition policy for plenty enough resources, but only in cartel ﬁghting if
the budget is tight. This may change if one assumes that merger and cartel are complementary,
as happens when ﬁrms merge ﬁrst and then engage in collusion. In this case the returns from
cartel ﬁghting are higher without a strict merger control, meaning that the two instruments of
competition policy become substitutable if the merger’s coordinated eﬀect is high enough, i.e.
the probability for a post-merger cartel to go undetected is high enough. This induces the CA
to never invest all the resources available in cartel ﬁghting.
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6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) The e ﬁrms choose to merge iﬀ c(∆)πC + (1 − c(∆))π < πM(e) − K ⇔
K <   K(∆) = πM(e) −
 
c(∆)πC + (1 − c(∆))π
 
. This cost threshold is increasing with ∆ :
∂ ￿ K(∆)
∂∆ = −c′(∆)






      
>0
> 0.
(i) If at the ﬁrst stage the CA invested M in merger control, then it observes the merger
type, so type e is cleared while type e is blocked iﬀ c(R−M)WC +(1−c(R−M))W > WM(e).
Note that the LHS of this condition is continuous and increasing with R. In addition, for R high
enough the merger is blocked since c(R − M) → 0, whereas for R = M the merger is cleared.
Therefore there exists a threshold   R such that the merger is blocked iﬀ R >   R.
12Proof of Proposition 1.
It is obviously always optimal to apply as strict a cartel ﬁghting as possible, i.e. always have
∆ = R − M. To determine the type of merger control, "soft" or "strict", let us compare below
the expected welfare from dealing with the e-type with and without merger control:
For R <   R
With merger control:
EWmc(R;M) = F(   K(R−M)) WM(e)+(1−F(   K(R−M)) [c(R − M)   Wc + (1 − c(R − M))   W]
Without merger control:
EW(R) = F(   K(R))   WM(e) + (1 − F(   K(R))   [c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W]
Note that EW(R) = EWmc(R;M = 0), and that
∂EWmc(R;M)
∂M = f(   K)  
∂   K




WM(e) − [c(R − M)   Wc + (1 − c(R − M))   W]
 
      
>0 from Lemma 1
+(1 − F(   K(R − M))  
∂c(R − M)
∂M       
>0
 (Wc − W)
      
<0
< 0.
Therefore EWmc(R;M) < EWmc(R;M = 0) = EW(R).
For R ≥   R





∂R       
<0
 (Wc − W)
      
<0
> 0
Without merger control: EW(R) = F(   K(R))WM(e)+(1−F(   K(R))[c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W]
where
∂EW(R)
∂R = f(   K)  ∂ ￿ K
∂R  
 
WM(e) − [c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W]
 








∂R       
>0
= f(   K)   ∂ ￿ K
∂R  
 
WM(e) − [c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W]
 
+(1 − F(   K(R))  
∂c(R)
∂R   (Wc − W) −
∂c(R−M)
∂R   (Wc − W) =
= f(   K)  
∂   K




WM(e) − [c(R)   Wc + (1 − c(R))   W]
 
      
<0 from Lemma 1
+(Wc − W)













      
>0
−F(   K(R))  
∂c(R)






Note that for very high R one has that EWmc(R) > EW(R), because EWmc(R) = W >
EW(R) =
 
1 − F(   K(R))
 
W + F(   K(R))   WM(e) ⇔ W > WM(e).
13As a result, ∃ R∗ such that for R > R∗, EWmc(R) > EW(R).
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) The e ﬁrms choose to merger iﬀ δc(∆)πMC(e)+(1−δc(∆))πM(e))−K ≥ c(∆)πC+(1−c(∆))π
⇔ K ≥   K(∆) = δc(∆)πMC(e) + (1 − δc(∆))πM(e)) −
 
c(∆)πC + (1 − c(∆))π
 
.

























∂∆ > 0 iﬀ δ > (πC−π)
(πMC(e)−πM(e)).









(ii) When the CA has invested in information acquisition to distinguish e from e (i.e.
investment in merger control), it will clear or ban the e-merger depending on the sign of
 




W   (1 − c(∆)) + WC   c(∆)
 
. This expression is
monotonic w.r.t. ∆ and decreasing with it for δ ≤ W−WC
WM(e)−WMC(e). Moreover, it tends to
WM(e) − W < 0 for R → ∞, whereas for R = 0, it tends to WMC(e) − WC > 0. Fur-
thermore, it is unambiguously decreasing with δ. Thus there exists a unique   R such that the
expression is negative iﬀ R >   R. For δ high enough,   R < M.
Proof of Proposition 2.




K −   K(R)
 
((1 − c(R))W + c(R)WC)
+ 1
K
  K(R)   ((1 − δc(R))WM(e) + δc(R)WMC(e)) + ((1 − δc(R))WM(e) + δc(R)WMC(e))





EW(R − M), if R <   R(δ)
(1 − c(R − M))W + c(R − M)WC+
 
(1 − δc(R − M))WM(e) + δc(R − M)WMC(e)
 
, if R >   R(δ)
.
The linearity of c(∆) and the uniform cumulative function F ensures the linearity w.r.t. R
of EWmc(R) and EW(R), which have therefore at most one crossing point if any. To determine
the optimal policy mix, we compare their slope and their extreme values for R = M and R → ∞.
- for very high R, and therefore R >   R(δ), one has that EWmc(R) > EW(R), because:
EWmc(R) = W + WM(e) > EW(R) = 1
K
 




  K(δ)   WM(e) + WM(e)
- for R = M, whenever M ≤   R(δ), that is for a low value of δ, EWmc(R = M) = EW(0) <
EW(R = M), since in this case the competition policy necessarily involves a soft merger control
if M is paid, thus this money is spent without any ﬁrms being prevented from merger, and
therefore without any welfare gain.
14As a result, by linearity, for δ low, there exists a unique R∗∗(δ) such that the optimal
competition policy consists of soft merger control and strict cartel ﬁghting for R ≤ R∗∗(δ), but
strict merger control and soft cartel ﬁghting for R > R∗∗(δ).
- Slope comparison






K −   K(R)
 
((1 − c(R))W + c(R)WC) + 1
K
  K(R)   ((1 − δc(R))WM(e) +
δc(R)WMC(e))










  K(R)  
 
δ(WMC − WM) − (WC − W)
 
      
>0 for δ high enough
+
+
∂   K(R)
∂R       
<0 for δ high enough
  




W   (1 − c(R)) + WC   c(R)
  
      
<0 for R>￿ R=M




∂R and EW(R) lower than EWmc(R) for
R very high. As a result, for δ high enough we have EWmc > EW for all R.
15